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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
public policy at least equal to that of a public official, that the present event
was of public interest, and that the plaintiff had thrust himself into public
discussion of the issue. If any of these elements were not shown to be present,
the societal and individual interests in protection of reputation would out-
weigh the interests in public debate and plaintiff would be allowed to recover.
PETER J. BREVORICA
TORTS-LBEL---FALsE ANNOUNCEMENT OF BETROTHAL IS ACTIONABLE
PER SE WHERE TR PARTIEs ARE ALREADY MARRIED TO OTHERS
Defendant's newspaper published an announcement that plaintiffs Hinsdale
and Reiber had become engaged to be married. In fact, they were already mar-
ried to others, worked in the same office, and lived with their respective spouses
and children in the same small community in which defendant's newspaper was
published. Hinsdale and Reiber (joined by her husband) commenced actions in
libel against defendant. No special damages' were alleged in either complaint.
The Supreme Court in Special Term dismissed both complaints, holding that
an allegation of special damage is necessary where the publication is defamatory
only in view of extrinsic facts. The Appellate Division affirmed without opinion. 2
The Court of Appeals reversed. Held, where a publication falsely announces the
betrothal of persons in fact already married to others, that publication is action-
able without a showing of special damage albeit the facts making it defamatory
(i.e., that the parties are already married to others) do not appear therein. Hins-
dale v. Orange County Publications, Inc., 17 N.Y.2d 284, 217 N.E.2d 650, 270
N.Y.S.2d 592 (1966).
Libel has been described as writing that tends to hold plaintiff up to "ridi-
cule, contempt, shame, disgrace or obloquy, to degrade him in the estimation of
the community . . . to diminish his respectability .... ,, Where such a tendency
is apparent on the face of a writing, most courts agree that it is actionable per
se (i.e., without showing special damages).4 If the publication becomes defama-
tory only in light of extrinsic facts (i.e., facts not appearing in the publication
itself), it is generally accepted that such facts must be specifically alleged,
1. The term "special damage" refers to specific material or pecuniary damage that is
a natural but not necessary result of the wrong. Thus, injury to reputation, humiliation,
mental anguish, and physical sickness, are not sufficient. Special damages must be pleaded
with particularity. See McCormick, Damages §§ 8, 114, 115 (1935).
2. 24 A.D.2d 704, 261 N.Y.S.2d 1005 (2d Dep't 1965).
3. 1 Seelman, Libel and Slander in New York ff 18, at 16 (rev. ed. 1964), cited with
approval in Hinsdale v. Orange County PubI., Inc., 17 N.Y.2d at 287, 217 N.E.2d at
652, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 595 (1966) [hereinafter cited instant case].
4. The courts thus make a presumption that damage to reputation will inevitably re-
sult from the publication. See e.g., Boyd v. Boyd, 116 Va. 326, 82 S.E. 110 (1914). See also
Prosser, Torts § 107, at 780 (3d ed. 1964); 1 Seelman, op. cit supra note 3, 1 331, at 439
n.5 (compilation of New York cases so holding).
5. See Van Heusen v. Argenteau, 194 N.Y. 309, 87 N.E. 437 (1909); Lasky v. Kemp-
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though courts disagree as to whether in such cases special damages must also be
alleged and proved."
This conflict has occurred among the New York courts, and has resulted in
two lines of authority. The first line, represented by the Court of Appeals' de-
cision in the case of O'Connell v. Press Publishing Co.,7 requires allegations and
proof of special damage to support an action of libel by extrinsic fact. That case
involved a newspaper report of federal grand jury investigations and criminal
prosecutions for alleged fraud in weighing sugar imports to avoid payment of
import duties. The report indicated that plaintiff testified before the grand jury
that he had invented a steel spring device, and had shown it to an official of the
company involved in the fraud, who referred him to an employee later indicted.
The article also reported certain facts heard by the grand jury, which, as the
O'Connell Court later noted, could have supported a conclusion that the spring
device was used to make the scales weigh falsely. Plaintiff alleged that the re-
port imputed criminal conduct to him, and pleaded the relevant federal criminal
fraud statutes. The Court of Appeals, applying what it called an "established
rule of law" that a publisher of libel by extrinsic fact is liable only for the spe-
cific pecuniary damage (special damage) caused thereby, reasoned that since
no such damage was alleged, the action could be maintained only if the publica-
tion was libelous "in and of itself." However, in finding the publication not to
be so libelous, the Court appears in fact to have taken account of the extrinsic
facts in basing its decision upon the unsuccessful attempt by plaintiff to ascribe
ton, 285 App. Div. 1121, 140 N.Y.S.2d 526 (1st Dep't 1955). See also 1 Harper & James,
Torts § 5.9, at 373 (1956).
Libel which depends upon extrinsic facts for its defamatory meaning is commonly
known as "libel by extrinsic fact," and will be so referred to herein. The classic case of libel
by extrinsic fact is considered to be Morrison v. Ritchie & Co., 4 Fraser (4 Sess. Cas.) 645,
39 Scot. L. Rep. 432 (1902) in which the publication announced that plaintiff had given
birth to twins when plaintiff's friends knew that she had been married only one month.
Prosser, op. cit. supra note 4, § 107, at 782 n.31.
6. Compare Ilitzky v. Goodman, 57 Ariz. 216, 112 P.2d 860 (1941), with Herrmann v.
Newark Morning Ledger Co., 48 NJ. Super. 420, 138 A.2d 61, aff'd on rehearing, 49 N.J.
Super. 551, 140 A.2d 529 (App. Div. 1958), and Martin v. Outboard Marine Corp., 15 Wis. 2d
452, 113 N.W.2d 135 (1962).
Courts which require special damage often use the term "libel per quod" to refer to
libel by extrinsic fact. Per quod was originally the phrase which prefaced allegations of
special damage; Black, Law Dictionary 1293-94 (4th ed. 1951).
The position of the majority of American jurisdictions is an issue of considerable debate.
See 1 Harper & James, Torts § 5.9, at 373 (1956); Eldredge, The Spurious Rule of Libel
Per Quod, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 733 (1966) (both concluding the majority view does not re-
quire special damages). But see Prosser, Libel Per Quod, 46 Va. L. Rev. 839 (1960); Prosser,
More Libel Per Quod, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1629 (1966).
The Restatement, Torts § 569 (1938) takes the position that all libel is actionable per
se. However, there is some question at the time of this writing as to whether the Restate-
ment (Second), Torts, yet to be published, will embody the same rule. See Restatement
(Second), Torts § 569 (Tent. Draft No. 12, 1966).
Part of the confusion apparent in many of the libel by extrinsic fact cases stems from
inconsistent usage of terms. For example, "libel per se" is used by some courts to mean
defamatory on its face, and by others to refer to libel that is actionable per se. Compare
Ilitzky v. Goodman, with the instant case. See also, Herrmann v. Newark Morning Ledger
Co., supra; Martin v. Outboard Marine Corp., supra; Berney, Libel and the First Amend-
ment-A New Constitutional Privilege, 51 Va. L. Rev. 1, 16 (1965); Eldredge, supra, at 737.
7. 214 N.Y. 352, 108 N,E, 556 (1915).
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a defamatory meaning (innuendo) to language which could not reasonably sup-
port such a meaning.8 Thus it would seem that the rule in O'Connell requiring
special damages was merely dictum,9 as the Court of Appeals in the instant case
held.'0 The rule has also been challenged as being unsupported by precedent,
although the O'Connell Court purportedly relied upon four Court of Appeals
cases."' It has been clearly demonstrated by commentators, however, that the
Court's reliance was unjustified since the cases cited were not in point.12
On the other hand, the second line of authority in New York holds that a
libel by extrinsic fact need not be supported by special damages. The leading
case therein is Sydney v. MacFadden Newspaper Publishing Co."3 There a
newspaper article reported that plaintiff was the "latest lady love" of a certain
famous actor, and intimated that the two might be planning marriage. The fact
that plaintiff was already married was not referred to in the publication, and no
special damages were pleaded. The Court of Appeals purportedly relied on
O'Connell for the proposition that to maintain the action in the absence of spe-
cial damages the publication must be "libelous per se," which in fact the Court
found it to be. Thus it was clear after Sydney that a writing could be "libelous
per se" even though its defamatory meaning depended upon extrinsic facts. 14
However, the Court apparently recognized a limitation on the kinds of extrinsic
facts which could be alleged when unsupported by special damages:
It has been suggested that this article says nothing about Doris
Keane being married. This is true. Neither does it say she is alive, or
of age, or a woman capable of being married. It speaks of Doris Keane
and gives her picture. This draws with it all that Doris Keane is-her
standing, her position in society, and her relationship in life.1r
This kind of limitation, to certain "basic" facts about plaintiff (such as mar-
riage) was reasonable since one may presume that such facts were known to at
least some of the readers even though not referred to in the publication. This
8. In its opinion the O'Connell Court stated, "The invention of a device which may
be used for criminal purposes and the showing of it to a person in whose business it might
be so used and the fact that he did use it, do not within reasonable and fair contemplation
or understanding, tend to incriminate or disgrace the inventor." Id. at 360, 108 N.E. at 558.
9. See Henn, Libel-By-Extrinsic-Fact, 47 Cornell L.Q. 14, 35 (1961). It should be
noted that the O'Connell decision was rendered by a divided court; the minority, however,
including Cardozo, J., did not state the grounds for its dissent.
10. Instant case at 290, 217 N.E.2d at 653-54, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 598.
11. McNamara v. Goldan, 194 N.Y. 315, 87 N.E. 440 (1909); Crashley v. Press Pub].
Co., 179 N.Y. 27, 71 N.E. 258 (1904); Bassell v. Ehnore, 48 N.Y. 561 (1872); Stone v.
Cooper, 2 Denio 293 (N.Y. 1845).
12. See 1 Seelman, op. cit. supra note 3, § 46, at 73; Henn, supra note 9, at 25;
Comment, 27 Fordbam L. Rev. 405, 406-8 (1958).
13. 242 N.Y. 208, 151 N.E. 209 (1926).
14. That is, the Court used "libel per se" to mean "actionable per se" rather than
to mean "on its face," or "in and of itself."
15. Sydney v. MacFadden Newspaper Publ. Co., 242 N.Y. 208, 213, 151 N.E. 209,
210 (1926) (Emphasis supplied.). Cf., Pitts v. Spokane Chronicle Co., 63 Wash. 763, 771,
388 P.2d 976, 981 (1964): "We hold then that words published in a daily newspaper
concerning such matters as betrothals, marriages, births, divorces and custody of children,
if false, may be shown to be libelous by proof of extrinsic circumstances, and thus become
actionable without proof of malice or special damages."
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reasoning, involving a presumption of knowledge, was expressly recognized in
Sydney,'0 as it bad been in at least one prior case,17 and has been applied where
the facts relate to the plaintiff's occupational status 8 or to the nature of the
subject matter with which plaintiff has been wrongly associated.' 9 However, in
these cases, the Court of Appeals, stressing specific reasons for admitting into
evidence the particular facts of each case, has refused to establish a general rule
that all extrinsic facts will be considered to determine whether a publication is
defamatory. At the same time, the Court failed, prior to the instant case, to
reconcile the O'Connell decision with subsequent holdings. The result has been
a lack of consistency among New York courts.
20
Two distinct holdings can be discerned in the opinion of the Court in the
instant case. The first concerns the basic question of what constitutes defama-
tion, and the second deals with the admissibility of extrinsic facts to show that
a particular charge was in fact made by the publication. As to the first holding,
the Court ruled that a statement which charged that a person already married
is about to marry a new partner is defamatory, apart from any charge of sexual
immorality, for such "imputes a violation of commonly accepted rules of marital
morality, a deviation from community norms." 21 The Court recognized that
even publishing that a married couple is about to be divorced is defamatory 22
In its second and undoubtedly more important holding, the Court ruled
that special damages are not required even though plaintiff alleges extrinsic facts
to show that the publication, innocent on its face, was in fact defamatory. In re-
jecting any interpretation of O'Connell to the contrary, the Court said, "If the
O'Connell case means that a libel per se action cannot stand if extrinsic facts
must be read with it or into it, then O'Connell is directly opposed to the nu-
merous decisions of our court .... ,23 In so discarding the famous dictum of
16. Sydney v. MacFadden Newspaper Publ. Co., 242 N.Y. 208, 214, 151 N.E. 209, 211
(1926).
17. Gates v. New York Recorder Co., 155 N.Y. 228, 49 N.E. 769 (1898).
18. See, e.g., Braun v. Armour & Co., 254 N.Y. 514, 173 N.E. 845 (1930) (plaintiff's
market is kosher); Ben-Oliel v. Press Publ. Co., 251 N.Y. 250, 167 N.E. 432 (1929) (plain-
tiff's eminence in her field); Blake v. Sun Printing & Publ. Ass'n, 229 N.Y. 515, 129 NX.
897 (1920) (plaintiff is an attorney).
19. See, e.g., Balabanoff v. Hearst Consol. Publ., Inc., 294 N.Y. 351, 62 N.E.2d 599
(1945); Gates v. New York Recorder Co., 155 N.Y. 228, 49 N.E. 769 (1898).
20. E.g., compare Smith v. Smith, 236 N.Y. 581, 142 N.E. 292 (1923), with Solotaire
v. Cowles Magazines, Inc., 107 N.Y.S.2d 798 (Sup. Ct. 1951); both cases involved the
extrinsic fact of marriage. Also, compare Ben-Oliel v. Press Publ. Co., 251 N.Y. 250, 167
N.E. 432 (1929), with Kuhn v. Veloz, 252 App. Div. 515, 299 N.Y. Supp. 924 (1st Dep't
1937), both cases involving occupational status. Note that in all cases above the defamatory
statement, if unwritten, would have been slander per se; however, since the lower courts
followed the O'Connell "rule," they determined that a charge that would be slanderous
per se would require special damages if written. Also compare the instant case below,
with Sydney v. MacFadden Newspaper Publ. Co., 242 N.Y. 208, 151 N.E. 209 (1926).
21. Instant case at 287, 217 N.E.2d at 651, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 595. Again, "we conclude,
therefore, that printed statements like those in this newspaper announcement about married
people are libelous per se. . . ." Id. at 288, 217 N.E.2d at 652, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 595.
22. Instant case at 287-88, 217 N.E.2d at 652, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 595.
23. Instant case at 290, 217 N.E.2d at 653, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 597. Note that the Court
uses the term "libel per se," as in Sydney, to mean libel that is actionable per se; e.g.,
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O'Connell, the Court left no basis upon which an allegation of special damage
can be required solely because extrinsic facts are relied upon. It held further
that the extrinsic fact alleged (i.e., marriage) was of such a nature that it could
be presumed to be known by plaintiff's acquaintances. 24 As to them, absence of
the fact in the publication made little difference, and the injurious tendency of
the announcement was not thereby voided. By the same reasoning, an extrinsic
fact of a nature that would not warrant a presumption of knowledge should be
treated identically if recipient's actual knowledge were proved. Other jurisdic-
tions have taken this position, but the precise question has never been directly
decided by the New York Court of Appeals. 25 However, in view of apparent re-
tention of the traditional common law rule,26 New York now appears to hold
that all libel is actionable without showing special damage, including that libel
which depends upon extrinsic facts for its defamatory meaning if such facts are
specifically alleged and known, or presumably known, to the recipients.
Recovery in libel is based primarily upon a presumption that damage will
result from a publication that has a tendency to injure plaintiff's reputation.27
Where such a tendency is apparent on the face of the writing, the presumption
follows as a matter of law.28 Where the tendency, although not apparent on the
face of the writing, is proved by extrinsic facts known (or presumably known)
by the recipients, it would logically follow that damage should again be pre-
sumed since the tendency to injure plaintiff's reputation again exists. This, in
fact, is the result reached at common law.29 It is irrelevant that defendant did
not intend to defame plaintiff, or that he was not negligent or had no notice that
he was doing so, since liability for defamation is not predicated upon fault.80
The doctrine of strict liability is not unique to defamation, nor is it inconsistent
"libelous per se, that is, that, without a showing of 'special' damage, they raise a presump-
tion of inevitable actual damage to reputation.. ." Instant case at 288, 217 N.E.2d at 652,
270 N.YS.2d at 595.
24. Although the Court noted that plaintiffs lived in the kind of small community in
which "people know each other," it is clear from the rest of the opinion and prior cases
that plaintiff's married status will always be deemed presumably known, regardless of the
size of his or her hometown. See, e.g., Smith v. Smith, 236 N.Y. 581, 142 N.E. 292 (1923);
Morey v. Morning Journal Ass'n, 123 N.Y. 207, 25 N.E. 161 (1890).
25. See, e.g., Herrmann v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 48 N.J. Super. 420, 444,
138 A.2d 61, 74, aff'd on rehearing, 49 N.9. Super. 551, 140 A.2d 529 (App. Div. 1958):
"[Tlhe harmful impact of a libel upon its victim is not less in the particular instance where
its odious meaning requires resort to extrinsic facts which are known to the recipient of
the libel." See also Restatement, Torts § 563, comment e at 149 (1938) (cited in the instant
case at 288, 217 N.E.2d at 652, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 596). The majority of extrinsic fact cases,
however, do involve facts which warrant such a presumption.
26. See Hinkle v. Alexander, 417 P.2d 586 (Ore. 1966); Prosser, Torts § 107, at 780-82
(3d ed. 1964); Restatement, Torts § 569, comment b (1938).
27. It has been said that, "The primary basis of an action for libel or defamation
is contained in the damage that results from the destruction of or harm to that most
personal and prized acquisition, one's reputation." Gruschus v. Curtis Publ. Co., 342 F.2d
775, 776 (10th Cir. 1965). See also Kennedy v. Item Co., 213 La. 347, 34 So. 2d 886 (1948).
28. Supra note 4.
29. See Cassidy v. Daily Mirror Newspapers, Ltd., [1929] 2 K.B. 331, 341-42 (Ct.
App.).
30. Restatement, Torts § 580 (1938). See also Prosser, Torts § 108, at 790 (3d ed,
1964); Corrigan v. Bobbs-Merrill Co., 228 N.Y. 58, 63, 126 N.E. 260, 262 (1920).
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with modern tort law.3 ' The application of strict liability in libel has been held
reasonable in its effect on newspapers.32 Often, a simple check into the news-
paper's own files or a city directory, or a call to plaintiff's home can prevent the
libel.3 8 Justification for strict liability is often phrased in concepts of social jus-
tice or realistic economics:3 4 e.g., enterprise liability, capacity to bear the loss,
and ability to spread the risk.35 Moreover, low cost insurance is available to
newspapers for this risk.36 These concepts are readily applicable to newspaper
libel,37 and fully support the result in the instant case.
RIcHARD C. SPENCER
31. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897,
27 Cal. Rep. 697 (1962); Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182
(1965). For example, strict liability is applied to workman's compensation; Bohlen, A
Problem in The Drafting of Workman's Compensation Acts, 25 Harv. L. Rev. 517 (1912);
harmful food cases; Freezer, Social Justice in the Field of Torts, 11 Minn. L. Rev. 313, 323
(1926); and generally to cases involving ultrahazardous activities, dangerous animals, etc.
See generally Prosser, Torts ch. 14 (3d ed. 1964); Carpenter, The Doctrine of Green v.
General Petroleum Corp., 5 So. Cal. L. Rev. 263, 265-66 (1932) (16 examples of applica-
tions of strict liability). See also Laufer, Tort Law in Transition: Charles S. Desmond's
Quarter Century on the New York Court of Appeals, 15 Buffalo L. Rev. 276, 280 (1965);
"[Tihe negligence concept appears to be yielding its central place in the tort universe as
we are entering an era in which the notion of strict liability will serve as a complement
if not counterpoise to the fault principle." As to current proposals that a type of strict
liability be extended to the field of automobile accidents, see Bergan, A Thesis on Motor
Vehicle Liability Without Fault, 28 Albany L. Rev. 199 (1964); Cohen, Fault and the Auto-
mobile Accident: The Lost Issue in California, 12 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 164 (1964); James,
Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance, 57 Yale L.J. 549
(1948); James, An Evolution of the Fault Concept, 32 Tenn. L. Rev. 394 (1965).
32. Such holding is evidenced by the following statement:
It is said that this decision would seriously interfere with the reasonable conduct of
newspapers. I do not agree. If publishers of newspapers, who have no more rights
than private persons, publish statements which may be defamatory of other people,
without inquiry as to their truth, in order to make their paper attractive, they must
take the consequences, if on subsequent inquiry, their statements are found to be un-
true or capable of defamatory and unjustifiable inferences.... To publish statements
first and inquire into their truth afterwards, may seem attractive and up to date.
Only to publish after inquiry may be slow, but at any rate it would lead to
accuracy and reliability.
Cassidy v. Daily Mirror Newspapers, Ltd., [1929] 2 K.B. 331, 341-42 (Ct. App.).
33. These facts have led one writer to say that "inadvertent newspaper libel seldom,
if ever, occurs without negligence." Morris, Inadvertent Newspaper Libel and Retraction,
32 Ill. L. Rev. 36 (1937).
34. See generally, e.g., Ehrenzweig, Negligence Without Fault (1951); Freezer, Social
Justice in the Field of Torts, 11 Minn. L. Rev. 313 (1926); Friedmann, Social Insurance
and the Principles of Tort Liability, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 241 (1949); Gregory, Trespass to
Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 Va. L. Rev. 359 (1951); James, Some Reflections on
the Bases of Strict Liability, 18 La. L. Rev. 293 (1958); Keeton, Conditional Fault in the
Law of Torts, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 401 (1959); Leflar, Negligence in Name Only, 27 N.Y.U.L.
Rev. 564 (1952); Ognall, Some Facets of Strict Tortious Liability in the United States and
Their Implications, 33 Notre Dame Law. 239 (19.58); Smith, Tort and Absolute Liability-
Suggested Changes in Classification, 30 Harv. L. Rev. 241, 319, 409 (1917).
35. See cases supra note 34. See also Prosser, Torts ch. 14 '(3d ed. 1964); Don-
nelly, Defamation by Radio: A Reconsideration, 34 Iowa L. Rev. 12, 21-23 (1948); Freezer,
Capacity To Bear Loss as a Factor in the Decision of Certain Types of Tort Cases, 78 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 805 (1930).
36. Donnelly, supra note 35, at 21 n.43 (1948); Leflar, Radio & TV Defamation:
"Fault" or Strict Liability, 15 Ohio St. L.J. 252, 266 n.57 (1954).
37. See, e.g., Donnelly, supra note 35; Morris, supra note 33. Newspaper libel con-
stitutes the vast majority of libel by extrinsic fact cases.
